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Abstract
We distinguish two types of debt crises: those that are the outcome of exogenous shocks (to
productivity growth for instance) and those that are endogenously created, either by self-
fulfilling panic in financial markets or by the reckless behavior of “Panglossian” borrowers.
After Krugman, we characterize as “Panglossian” those borrowers who only focus on their
best growth prospects, anticipating to default on their debt if hit by an adverse shock,
rationally ignoring the risk of default.
We apply these categories empirically to the data. We show that, taken together, en-
dogenous crises are powerful explanations of debt crises, more important for instance than
the sheer effect of growth on a country’s solvency.
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1. Introduction
International debt crises are (very) costly. Why do we observe that so many countries
fall into their trap? Should we not expect more prudent behavior from such countries? The
theoretical answer in fact is: it depends. Take the simplest form of financial crisis driven by
an exogenous shock. Spreads on sovereign bonds are high because the country is expected
to be vulnerable to an earthquake or to a long-lasting commodity shock that is beyond its
control. The country should then indeed behave with increased prudence: the greater the
debt the country might have to repay, the heavier the cost of the earthquake relative to
a favorable state of the nature. Yet, on the other hand, if the expected earthquake is so
large that the country knows that it will actually default on its debt, then a “Panglossian
attitude” (as Krugman, 1998, has coined it) may become rational: the debt will lose all value
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after the earthquake, and it would then be absurd not to have borrowed more beforehand.
The country then behaves as if the risk of unfavorable shocks can be ignored. Following Dr.
Pangloss, the character of Voltaire’s book Candide, the country acts as if only “the best of
all possible worlds” will occur. In this case, debt endogenously leads to debt; we call this
the self-enforcing case.
Let us now consider the case when crises are driven by the lack of confidence of financial
markets towards a given country, making the country financially fragile through self-fulfilling
behavior. Self-fulfilling debt crises have been analyzed in different forms. In the model of
Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000), self-fulfilling crises are a variant of liquidity crises, by which
a lack of coordination among creditors leads a solvent country to default. As argued by
Chamon (2007), however, such crises can readily be avoided when lenders manage to offer
contingent loans of the kind organized by venture capitalists: if any individual creditor offers
a line of credit, conditionally on other creditors following suit, then liquidity crises can be
easily avoided.
Self-fulfilling crises have also been analyzed as the perverse outcome of a snowball effect
through which the buildup of debt becomes unmanageable, out of the endogenous fear that
it can indeed become unmanageable (Calvo, 1988). Relying on an intuition developed in a
simpler model in Cohen and Portes (2006), we show that snowball spirals can only occur in
cases where a debt crisis has the potential of damaging the fundamentals of the indebted
country. If a crisis reduces the GDP of a country by say 10%, then it is clear that the
lack of confidence toward a country can degenerate into a self-fulfilling crisis. If instead the
fundamentals are not altered by the crisis, we show that self-fulfilling crises of the Calvo
type are (theoretically) impossible.
At the end of this argument, we chose to focus on a simple characterization of a self-
fulfilling debt crisis as one that is the outcome of an endogenous weakening of the country’s
fundamentals. In the self-fulfilling case so defined, it is the crisis that reduces the GDP,
originating from the various disruptions that a weakening of the confidence in a country may
bring about (capital flight, exchange rate crisis...). In the “earthquake case,” the sequence
of causation is inverted: the fundamentals are first destroyed, then the crisis occurs.
From the theoretical model that we present, a simple typology of cases is obtained. Below
a critical level of debt, a country tends to act prudently, aiming for instance to reduce its
debt in response to a permanent adverse shock. Past a critical level of the debt-to-GDP
ratio, which can be the outcome of a sequence of repeated unfavorable exogenous shocks,
the country will begin to behave in the Panglossian mode, rationally ignoring the bad news,
increasing the level of debt to its upper limit in a self-enforcing process. A crisis may then
occur either because of the occurrence of another adverse exogenous shock, or because of a
self-fulfilling shock, one that endogenously weakens the ability of the country to service its
debt.
The data is analyzed with this type of typology in mind. We use a slightly modified
version of the database that has been compiled by Kraay and Nehru (2006), which we
updated to cover all debt crises that have occurred until 2004. Following and adapting the
work of these authors, we first show that the likelihood of a debt crisis is well explained by
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three factors: the debt-to-GDP ratio, the level of real income per capita, and a measure of
overvaluation of the domestic currency.
In order to estimate the risk of a self-fulfilling debt crisis, we then distinguish the law
of motion of the debt-to-GDP ratio in normal times from the motion triggered by the onset
of the crisis. We define a self-fulfilling crisis as one that would not have happened, had
debt-to-GDP simply been driven along the pre-crisis path. We find that self-fulfilling crises,
so defined, correspond to a small minority of cases. On average, between 6% and 12% of
crises (depending on the methodology) appear to be self-fulfilling. This proportion is clearly
not negligible, however, and deserves to be taken seriously.
We also calibrate the strength of the Panglossian effect. We show that countries do
appear to have behaved as if the distribution of the risk was truncated, leading the country
to ignore risk. The influence of this mechanism on the debt buildup is tested through Monte-
Carlo simulation. We show that it is substantial and representing about 12% of the cases
(see Arellano, 2008, for similar insights applied to the the case of Argentina).
In this paper, we proceed as follows: in section 2, we set up an horizon model that we
solve and analyze, first in the two period case in section 3, then in the general case in section
4. We then turn in section 5 to the presentation of the data supporting our econometric
analyses. In section 6, we build and estimate an econometric model which enables us to
quantify the importance of both self-fulfilling and self-enforcing crises. Section 7 concludes.
2. A Panglossian theory of debt
In this section we develop a modeling framework which shares many features with the
seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and with more recent works such as Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). Compared to these papers, our model mainly differs in
two ways. The first difference is how we specify the penalty in case of default: in our model,
we decompose this penalty into two components, namely the part which is captured by the
investors and the part which is socially lost. The second difference concerns the negotiation
process between lenders and investors: in this paper, we assume that the negotiation occurs
on the amount to be repaid tomorrow, rather than on the amount to be lent today. These
two changes open the possibility for a rich analysis of self-fulfilling crises, as discussed below.
For the remaining, our model is fairly standard. In particular, the Panglossian effect that we
exhibit is not specific to our setup and is actually present in most models of the literature.
Our contribution in this respect is rather to put this mechanism in evidence and then to
analyze its empirical relevance.
2.1. The economy
We consider a one-good exchange economy. The country is inhabited by a representative
consumer who can tilt consumption away from autarky by borrowing or lending on the
international financial markets.
Output produced at time t is a random variable Qt, driven by a Markovian process. More
precisely, the (gross) growth rate of output gt =
Qt
Qt−1
is assumed to be an i.i.d. variable,
with a cumulative distribution function F(g). In other words, logQt is a random walk. For
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the sake of simplicity, the support of g is supposed to lie in a bounded interval of the form
(0, gmax].
The world financial markets are characterized by a constant riskless rate of interest r.
Lenders are risk-neutral and subject to a zero-profit condition by competition. We further
suppose that debt is short-term and needs to be refinanced at every period.
In order to ensure that the wealth of the country is finite, we make the assumption that
the average growth rate g¯ is less than the gross interest rate 1 + r.
At any time t, a country that has accumulated a debt Dt may decide to default upon it.
When it does so, we assume that the country suffers forever after a negative productivity
shock. One can say that the default creates a panic that destroys capital either through
an exchange-rate or a banking crisis. We simply assume that post-default output can be
written:
Qdt = µQt
in which µ ∈ (0, 1]. As another cost, we assume that the country is subject to financial
autarky, being unable to borrow again later on (a milder form of a sanction would be,
more realistically, that the country is barred from the financial market for some time only;
analytically, the outcome is formally equivalent).
Once the country has defaulted, creditors will attempt to recover some of their losses. In
order to do so, they further reduce the resources of the country in a way which, we assume,
is socially efficient: the fraction that they grab is simply subtracted, one for one, from the
country’s post-default output. Call λt the fraction so reduced. We assume that λt is itself an
i.i.d. stochastic variable, in the domain [0, 1) and independent of gt, which varies with the
(legal) strength of the international financial community. We denote by G(λt) the cumulative
distribution function of λt. Creditors therefore capture:
Pt = λtQ
d
t ,
while the country consequently consumes (given financial autarky):
Ct = (1− λt)Qdt .
In the case when µ is equal to one, the outcome may be characterized as an efficient
restructuring of the debt, at least from a static point of view (we return to this issue below):
creditors are able to capture a fraction of output, which is less than what they are owed, but
without imposing a social cost to the economy. When instead, µ < 1, then the implication
is that default is socially costly, imposing a loss that is captured by no one.
2.2. Financial markets
The timing of events unfolds as follows. First assume that the country has incurred a
debt obligation Dt, falling due at time t, and has always serviced it in full in previous periods.
At the beginning of period t, the country learns the value of its output Qt and the fraction
λt of post-default output that would be captured were it to default. After observing these
variables, the country decides to default or to reimburse its debt.
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If the debt is reimbursed in full, the country can contract a new loan, borrowing Lt,
which must be repaid at time t + 1, in the amount of Dt+1. In order to avoid coordination
problems, we assume, following Chamon (2007), that creditors can commit on Lt and Dt+1
before the decision to service the debt is known, conditionally on the decision to service the
debt being made.
Such financial agreements being concluded, the country eventually consumes, in the event
it services its debt in full:
Crt = Qt + Lt −Dt
Alternatively, in the event of a debt crisis the country’s consumption is nailed down to
Cdt = (1− λt)Qdt .
We denote by D(Dt+1, Qt) the default set, i.e. the set consisting of all realizations
(gt+1, λt+1) for which the country will decide to default in t+ 1, conditionally on the level of
outstanding debt Dt+1 and past output Qt. We denote by R(Dt+1, Qt) the repayment set,
i.e. the complementary to the default set.
We can then define the risk of a debt crisis in t+1, as it is perceived from the perspective
of date t:
pit+1|t = P(D(Dt+1, Qt)).
The zero-profit condition for creditors may be written as:
Lt(1 + r) = Dt+1(1− pit+1|t) +
∫
D(Dt+1,Qt)
Vt+1(g Qt, λ)dF(g)dG(λ) (1)
in which Vt+1(Qt+1, λt+1) is the discounted present value of all cash-flows that the banks
will be able to extract from the country, when they expect to receive forever after t + 1 an
amount Pt+1+T = λt+1+TQ
d
t+1+T in every period.
Finally, the usual no-Ponzi game condition is supposed to hold so that:
lim
T→+∞
Et
Dt+T
(1 + r)t+T
= 0.
2.3. Preferences
The decision to default or to stay current on the financial markets involves a comparison
of two paths that imply expectations over the entire future. In order to address this problem,
we assume that the country seeks to solve:
J∗(Dt, Qt, λt) = max{Ct+T }T≥0
Et
{ ∞∑
T=0
βTu(Ct+T )
}
where β is the discount factor, Ct > 0. Note that Dt can be negative if the country builds
up foreign assets. We assume that utility is isoelastic, of the form:
u(Ct) =
C1−γt
1− γ (2)
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where 1
γ
is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. In order to incorporate a tendency
to accumulate debt, we make the hypothesis that:
β(1 + r)g¯−γ < 1 (3)
We shall call:
Jd(Qt, λt) = Et
{ ∞∑
T=0
βTu((1− λt+T )Qdt+T )
}
the post-default level of utility, which becomes by definition independent of debt, and to
which the country is nailed down in case of servicing difficulties.
If instead it were to stay current on its debt obligation, it would obtain:
Jr(Dt, Qt) = max
Lt,Dt+1
{
u(Qt −Dt + Lt) + β
∫
D(Dt+1,Qt)
Jd(gt+1Qt, λt+1)dF(gt+1)dG(λt+1)
+ β
∫
R(Dt+1,Qt)
Jr(Dt+1, gt+1Qt)dF(gt+1)dG(λt+1)
}
subject to the zero-profit condition (1). Note that Jr(Dt, Qt) does not depend on the current
value of λt.
When comparing how much it can get by staying on the markets and the post-default
level of welfare, the country picks up its optimum level:
J∗(Dt, Qt, λt) = max
{
Jr(Dt, Qt), J
d(Qt, λt)
}
Here J∗(Dt, Qt, λt) is a function of the current value of λt through the influence of Jd.
Given the Markovian structure of the economy and the isoelastic preferences, the decision
to default will depend on whether the debt-to-GDP ratio is above or below a (stochastic)
threshold which itself will be a function of the stochastic parameter λt. Before showing
formally this result and digging deeper into the explicit consequences of the model, let us
first analyze a simpler two-period case which will highlight its key properties.
3. A two-period model
3.1. The economy
In order to grasp the logic of the model, let us consider a simple two-period model which
will provide the intuition behind our framework. The model follows the intuition of Cohen
and Portes (2006).
In period 1, output is known, and the country just takes one decision, the amount of
debt it borrows.
In period 2, we simplify the stochastic structure of the economy and assume that output
can take two values, a good or a bad one, with respective probabilities 1−p and p. The only
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decision left to the country is to repay or default. Let us briefly rephrase, with the notations
of the previous section, the logic of the model.
Call L1 the amount of debt borrowed in period 1 and D2 the contractual amount to be
repaid in period 2. We assume that initial debt is nil: D1 = 0.
If the country does not honor its contractual obligations in period 2, it is subject to a
negative output shock of magnitude 1− µ, captured by no-one, and which is the measure of
the negative externality associated to the crisis. In the case when µ = 1, default is efficient
ex post : no loss of resources is imposed on the whole community of creditors and debtors.
The creditors themselves only grasp a portion λ of the post-default output µQ2. In this
simplified example, we take λ to be a deterministic scalar. In the case when λ = 0, the
recovery is nil for the creditors. Note that recovery is stated here as a function of output, as
it should be in general: when the debt is too large, creditors attempt to grab a part of the
remaining pie.
We can then summarize the model as follows:
In period 1 In period 2
with prob. 1− p with prob. p
Q1 Q2 = Q
+
2 Q2 = Q
−
2 (before default)
C1 = Q1 + L1 C2 = C
+
2 = Q
+
2 −D2 C2 = C−2 = max{Q−2 −D2, (1− λ)µQ−2 }
We assume that the country goes on the market to borrow an amount L1 in response
to which the creditors ask for an amount D2 to be repaid in period 2. Since they are risk
neutral, creditors either impose the following safe line of credit Ds2 defined by:
L1(1 + r) = D
s
2 (4)
when the country is expected to repay its debt in both states of natures, or an unsafe line
of credit Du2 defined by:
L1(1 + r) = (1− p)Du2 + pµλQ−2 (5)
when a renegotiation is expected to take place in the bad state of nature.
In this simple two period model, the transversality (no-Ponzi) condition is imposed
through the fact that the country leaves no debt at the end of period 2 (i.e. D3 = 0).
In period 2, the country either pays the debt in full or defaults (and pays less than the face
value). In our model, D2 is a function of L1. The equilibrium can be thought as a charac-
terization of an equilibrium yield function on the loans extended in period 1. The spread ρ
overs the riskless rate is a solution to ρ(L1) = D2(L1)/L1(1 + r)− 1.
Last, we assume that the country attempts to solve the following program:
max
C1,C2
u(C1) + β E1u(C2)
where the instantaneous utility function u is given by (2).
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3.2. The equilibrium
3.2.1. The safe case
Let us first analyze the case when the country repays its debt in both states of nature.
This will occur when:
D2 < κQ
−
2 ,
in which:
κ = 1− (1− λ)µ.
In this case, the credit constraint boils down to (4), so that the first order condition can be
written:
u′(C1) = β(1 + r){(1− p)u′(C+2 ) + p u′(C−2 )}
or, in explicit form:
u′(Q1 + L1) = β(1 + r){(1− p)u′(Q+2 − L1(1 + r)) + p u′(Q−2 − L1(1 + r))}
In this case, consumption in period 1 is an increasing function of Q−2 . When the bad
state of nature is awful, with a low Q−2 , the country is prudent, and consumes less in the
first period. It will have to repay for its debt in a worst case scenario and that reduces its
propensity to borrow.
3.2.2. The unsafe case
Consider now the case when the equilibrium value of D2 is such that D2 > κQ
−
2 . In that
case the country will not repay its debt in the second period when the bad state materializes.
Creditors, ex ante, tie debt and repayment according to (5), so that the first order
condition boils down to:
u′(C1) = β(1 + r)u′(C+2 ) (6)
This is the same Euler equation as in the riskless rate, with only one (good) state of
nature! The occurrence of the bad state of nature is not taken into account, at least directly.
The structure is equivalent to the Blanchard-Yaari (Blanchard, 1985; Yaari, 1965) model,
where the probability of death of the individuals does not appear—at least directly—in the
Euler equation.
The critical difference with Blanchard-Yaari (BY henceforth) is that the probability of
death, i.e. of default here, is endogenous in our model when it is biological in BY. The
other difference is that the government is infinitely lived in BY when it is the sovereign itself
which is subject to the risk of death in our framework. The core analogy between the two
models remains identical however as far as the decisions to save or borrow are concerned.
Rational agents truncate the perception of the future, when they take debt or investment
decisions, to the subset of events when they are still alive (or solvent). This truncation
creates a Panglossian factor upon which we shall rely, below, to offer an empirical test of our
model.
When λ > 0, Q−2 does play a role, indirectly: the larger it is, the higher the supply curve,
allowing the country to borrow in more favorable terms. In the extreme case when λ = 0,
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the case with no recovery, Q−2 entirely disappears from the picture. The country behaves as
if the best outcome only where to occur, ignoring the bad outcome, to the extent that it has
no bearing on its decision to borrow.
This is the Panglossian effect that we alluded to. The country is totally indifferent to
the bad states of nature, while in the safe equilibrium it was instead very concerned about
it.
In the model above we assume that a renegotiation occurs after a default, so that some
recovery is granted to the creditors. The recovery comes in proportion to the ability of the
creditors to extract a flow of payments from the debtors before the courts. In our model, the
recovery is a function of the state of the economy, and does not depend at all on the debt
due. The idea is that the debt being too large anyway, it has to be cut to be in line with
the fundamentals.
One can think of situations however where the recovery is a combination of the nominal
value due and of the fundamentals. The bargaining power of the creditors for instance may
be proportionate to how many they are or to what is at stake for them. In that case, one
may write that the recovery V is the sum of two terms:
V = (1− γ)λµQ−2 + γD2
in which γ is some positive number smaller than one. In that case, the first order condition
is driven by
(1 + r)
∂L1
∂D2
= (1− p) + p γ
which is translated into a new Euler equation:
u′(C1) = β(1 + r)
(1− p)u′(C+2 ) + p γ u′(C−2 )
1− p(1− γ)
As we move from γ = 1 to γ = 0, we switch from the standard Euler first order condition
to the Panglossian case.
3.2.3. The risk of multiple equilibria
In a standard setup, the interest rate charged by investors is entirely determined the
probability of default, via the risk premium: the higher the risk, the higher the interest rate.
But the reverse causality can very well be also at work. One may have situations where
two equilibria are possible: a “good equilibrium” where the investors ask for a low interest
rate, leading to a low debt-to-GDP tomorrow—and therefore a low risk of default, consis-
tently with the low interest rate—, and a “bad equilibrium” where investors ask for a high
interest rate—consistently leading to a high level of risk.
Multiple equilibria are possible in this model whenever µ < 1. In the context of our model,
a country can be safe, if priced as such, and unsafe, if regarded as risky, whenever default
leads to an inefficient loss of output. This would be the case if we could simultaneously have:
Ds2 < κQ
−
2 ,
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which means that the country will not renegotiate its debt in the second period if offered a
safe line of credit, and:
Du2 > κQ
−
2
which means that it would renegotiate the debt, if priced at the risk adjusted rate. Plugging
the value of Ds2 and D
u
2 into these two inequalities, one finds that multiple equilibria are
feasible when the amount borrowed in the first period stands in the following range:
κQ−2 − p(1− µ)Q−2 < L1(1 + r) < κQ−2
The first inequality means that the repayment is too large to be honored at the risk
adjusted interest, when the second means that the riskless rate is indeed self-enforcing. We
demonstrate the generality of this insight in the next section. The range of multiple equilibria
becomes larger as µ gets smaller. In the limiting case when µ = 1, no multiple equilibria are
feasible. The intuition is fairly straightforward: multiple equilibria are possible when the
fear of a crisis has the potential to destroy the fundamentals upon which the debt is repaid,
self-fulfillingly reducing the ability of the country to pay. In the case when the fundamentals
are immune to the judgment of the market, only one equilibria stands out.
3.2.4. Summary
In the end, this simplified model shows that debt crises can be the endogenous effects of
two forces: a self-enforcing and a self-fulfilling mechanism.
Figure 1 shows what is at stake. In the efficient case, the supply of credit is continuous
and monotonic, the “fundamentals” upon which the country repays its debt are not affected
by the decision to default, and just one equilibrium is possible. In the inefficient case, a
bad credit rating has the potential to destroy output endogenously with probability p. Two
equilibria, corresponding to the two values of these fundamentals, can arise simultaneously.
4. Recursive equilibrium
4.1. Definition and basic properties
We now define a recursive equilibrium in the infinite horizon model. Such an equilibrium
consists of a set of policy functions for the country and the investors. We assume that agents
act sequentially and that the government does not have commitment.
As in the two-period model, we also make the assumption that in the process of nego-
tiating debt contracts, the country first announces the amount L that it wants to borrow
today, and the investors reply with the amount D′ that they ask tomorrow for that loan.
Definition 1 (Recursive equilibrium). A recursive equilibrium is defined by default and
repayment sets D and R, value functions Jr, Jd, J∗ for the country, a policy function D˜′
and a default value function V for the investors, such as:
• The value function Jd in case of default satisfies
Jd(Q, λ) = u((1− λ)µQ) + β
∫
Jd(g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′) (7)
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Figure 1: The risk of multiple equilibria
D2
L1
κQ−2
Efficient case (µ = 1)
unsafe
safe
Ds2D
u
2 D2
L1
κQ−2
Inefficient case (µ < 1)
unsafe
safe
Ds2D
u
2
The dashed lines correspond to pairs (L1, D2) that cannot be realized in equilibrium. Conversely
the solid lines correspond to possible equilibria. The gray area in the inefficient case shows the
region where multiple equilibria are possible.
• Given default and repayment sets D and R and investors’ policy function D˜′, the value
function Jr in case of repayment satisfies:
Jr(D,Q) = max
L∈L (Q), L≥D−Q
{
u(Q−D + L) + β
∫
D(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
Jd(g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′)
+ β
∫
R(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
Jr(D˜′(L,Q), g′Q)dF(g′)dG(λ′)
}
(8)
where L (Q) characterizes the domain of definition of D˜′.
• J∗ is the maximum of Jr and Jd, and the default and repayment sets verify:
(g′, λ′) ∈ D(D′, Q) ⇔ (g′, λ′) /∈ R(D′, Q) ⇔ Jd(g′Q, λ′) > Jr(D′, g′Q)
• The value that investors can extract in case of default satisfies:
V (Q, λ) = λµQ+
1
1 + r
∫
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′) (9)
• Given the default and repayment sets D and R, the policy function of investors satisfies
the zero-profit condition for all L ∈ L (Q):
L(1 + r) = D˜′(L,Q)P[R(D˜′(L,Q), Q)] +
∫
D(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′) (10)
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Just as in the two period model, the policy function of investors is equivalent to defining
an equilibrium interest spread over the riskless rate ρ(L,Q) as a solution to: ρ(L,Q) =
D′(L,Q)/L(1 + r)− 1.
At this point, it is important to note that our model is constructed in such a way that
homogeneous equilibria, as defined below, are possible.
Definition 2 (Homogeneous recursive equilibrium). A recursive equilibrium is said homo-
geneous if it satisfies the following relationships for a > 0:
Jr(aD, aQ) = a1−γJr(D,Q)
Jd(aQ, λ) = a1−γJd(Q, λ)
J∗(aD, aQ, λ) = a1−γJ∗(D,Q, λ)
D˜′(aL, aQ) = a D˜′(L,Q)
V (aQ, λ) = a V (Q, λ)
L (aQ) = aL (Q) (with obvious notation)
The possibility of homogeneous recursive equilibria stems from three specific features of
our model: the isoelasticity of the utility function, the specific form of the output process
(i.i.d. in growth rates), and the proportionality of default costs.
It is theoretically possible that our model has recursive equilibria that are not homoge-
neous, but such equilibria are more of the nature of mathematical curiosities rather than
economically relevant objects. In the following, we will therefore assume that there exists
at least a homogeneous equilibria, which satisfies standard regularity conditions, and we
establish several results that apply to these homogeneous recursive equilibria.
Proposition 1. Default occurs if and only if debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than a given
threshold d∗(λ).
Proof. Immediate consequence of the homogeneity of value functions.
When λ is revealed at any time t, being a common knowledge to both the debtor and the
lenders, the flow of new loans is either sufficient to allow the country to keep servicing its
outstanding stock of debt, or instead it is instantaneously dried out as creditors understand
that the country will not service its debt.
Definition 3 (Market shock). We refer to a change of the default threshold d∗(λ) as a
market shock, to the extent that it measures the shift in the perceived enforcement technology
in the hands of creditors. One can think of the perceived international legal environment as
the underlying fundamental of this shock (see for example the Argentina versus Elliott case).
Finally, we introduce a definition, which will be useful for characterizing the case of
multiple equilibria:
Definition 4 (Smooth default). We call the smooth default case the situation where the
default threshold is equal to what the investors can extract in case of default, i.e. when
d∗(λ) = V (1, λ).
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Clearly, a smooth default is only possible when µ = 1, i.e. when a default leads to an
efficient restructuring of the debt from a static point of view (there is still an inefficiency
related to the loss of access to financial markets).2 The reciprocal is not true: it is possible to
have statically efficient defaults which are not smooth. Think of a country with a low rate of
time preference (lower than the riskless interest rate), and with a linear utility function. It is
easy to show that, in that case, the country will be willing to repay a debt higher than what
investors would extract in case of default (simply because the country has a lower discount
rate than investors).
4.2. The risk of multiple equilibria
Formally, a multiple equilibrium in the interest rate is a situation where, for a given Lt,
there are two values D1t+1 < D
2
t+1 verifying the zero-profit condition (10).
Proposition 2. Multiple equilibria in the interest rate are impossible in the smooth default
case.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
This result is the generalization of the result obtained in the two-period model of section 3.
What drives the multiple equilibrium case is the fact that the crisis endogenously destroys
part of the fundamentals upon which the debt is repaid. This may be the key reason
why corporate self-fulfilling debt crises are a curiosity. To the extent that an appropriate
bankruptcy procedure exists, the risk that a financial crisis can, out of its own making,
endanger the value of a firm is much reduced. This kind of multiple equilibria in the interest
rate, also called the “snowball effect,” have been studied by Calvo (1988).
Note that multiple equilibria in the interest rate are possible in our model because the
country announces L and the investors reply with some D′ which satisfies the zero-profit
condition; as noted by Chamon (2007, footnote 7), such multiple equilibria are impossible
in the reverse setup, where the country announces D′ and the investors reply with the
corresponding L.
4.3. Dynamics
We now derive the Euler equation of a country which is current on its debt at the time of
the decision. For the sake of simplicity, we switch back to the notation using time subscripts.
The first order condition of the maximization in (8) leads to:
u′(Ct) = β
∂Dt+1
∂Lt
Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ] (11)
(using the fact that Jr and Jd are equal at the default threshold). Here the term Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ]
stands for the expectation of u′(Ct+1), from the perspective of date t, conditionally on the
decision to repay at date t+ 1. This equation is the analog of equation (6) in the two-period
model.
2See proposition 3 in Appendix B.1 for a proof.
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Assume in the following that λ is a constant (the general case is treated in Appendix
B.2). This corresponds to the case when there is a given deterministic threshold for debt to
be repaid in full. With obvious notations, the zero-profit condition (10) for creditors may be
written as:
Lt(1 + r) = Dt+1(1− pit+1|t) +
g∗t+1∫
0
V (gt+1Qt)dF(gt+1)
where g∗t+1 =
Dt+1
d∗Qt is the growth threshold under which the country defaults.
Taking the derivative with respect to Dt+1, one gets:
(1 + r)
∂Lt
∂Dt+1
= (1− pit+1|t)−
∂pit+1|t
∂Dt+1
[Dt+1 − V (g∗t+1 Qt)]
or:
∂Lt
∂Dt+1
=
1
1 + r
(
1− pit+1|t − ξt+1|t
)
in which ξt+1|t is a scalar which is nil in the smooth default case (i.e. when Dt+1 = V (g∗t+1Qt))
and positive otherwise.3 The term ξt+1|t can be coined as the “default wedge.” Note that
this term did not appear in the simplified two period model, for which
∂pit+1|t
∂Dt+1
= 0 given the
discrete structure of probability of default.
The term 1−pit+1|t−ξt+1|t is the marginal price of debt, in the sense of Bulow and Rogoff
(1988): it is the total value to creditors of having the face value of the country’s debt raised
by one dollar. In this case, it is equal to the probability of repayment, minus an extra loss
incurred by the investors when the default is not smooth.
Substituting ∂Lt
∂Dt+1
for its value and using the approximation
1−pit+1|t
1−pit+1|t−ξt+1|t ' 1 + ξt+1|t,
we can then rewrite the Euler equation (11) as:
u′(Ct) = β(1 + r)(1 + ξt+1|t)Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ] (12)
The term ξt+1|t tends to raise the marginal utility of consumption at time t and conse-
quently reduces the propensity to borrow. To the extent that default entails a social loss,
the benefit of borrowing against future risk is reduced, decreasing the desirability of debt in
consequence.
4.4. A linear approximation
We now write the first-order linear approximation of the model presented so far. We
linearize around the balanced growth path, i.e. the steady state of the detrended version of
the model. The detrending factor of a variable at date t is Qt, so that Xˆt =
Xt
Qt
. Using these
notation, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
u′(Cˆt) = β(1 + r)(1 + ξt+1|t)Et
[
g−γt+1u
′(Cˆt+1)
∣∣∣R(Dˆt+1, 1)] (13)
3See Appendix B.2 for a proof.
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Because of assumption (3), this equation cannot be satisfied at the deterministic steady
state. This means that in the absence of stochastic shocks, the solution is a corner one: the
country borrows up to the default limit, before it becomes rationed by the investors. Using
the law of motion of debt, assuming a constant debt-to-GDP ratio where the country is
indifferent between default and repayment, one gets the following deterministic steady state:
¯ˆ
D =
(1 + r)(1− (1− λ)µ)
1 + r − g¯
We now proceed to a linearization around that point. Let us note: u′(Cˆt) = −∂Jr∂D (Dˆt, 1) =
a0 − a1 (Dˆt − ¯ˆD). Using the approximation g−γt+1 ' 1 − γ(gt+1 − 1), we may then rewrite
equation (13) as:
a0 − a1(Dˆt − ¯ˆD) = a2
[
a0 + a0γ (g
+
t+1|t − 1)− a1(Dˆ∗t+1 − ¯ˆD)
]
(14)
in which g+t+1|t = Et
[
gt+1
∣∣∣R(Dˆ∗t+1, 1)], a2 = β(1 + r)(1 + ξ) (neglecting here the variability
of the factor ξ), and Dˆ∗t+1 is the corresponding first best decision regarding debt. Let us
denote:
Ξt+1|t = g+t+1|t − g¯ = pit+1|t(g+t+1|t − g−t+1|t), (15)
in which g−t+1|t = Et
[
gt+1
∣∣∣D(Dˆ∗t+1, 1)]. The Euler equation can then be written as:
Dˆ∗t+1 = a3 + a4 Dˆt + a5 Ξt+1|t (16)
where a3, a4 and a5 are obvious to deduce from (14) and (15).
The term a5Ξt+1|t is the Panglossian term, which measures the way creditors truncate
their forecasting set.
Equation (16) determines the optimal debt target, but in practice this level cannot be
achieved for two reasons: first, there is some inertia in the adjustment process, for insti-
tutional or political reasons; second, as shown by Campos et al. (2006), there is a lot of
extrinsic noise in the level of debt, due to either unforeseen contingencies debt or unpre-
dicted valuation effects. We therefore assume that the debt target D∗t+1 differs from the
actual debt Dt+1, and that the two are related by the following equation:
Dt+1 = (1− ρ)D∗t+1 + ρDt + εdt+1Qt+1
where εdt+1 is an i.i.d. shock and ρ ∈ [0, 1] measures the inertia of the adjustment. Detrending
this equation, and using the linearization 1/gt+1 ' 2− gt+1, one gets:
Dˆt+1 = (1− ρ)Dˆ∗t+1 + ρ (2− gt+1)Dˆt + εdt+1 (17)
The deviation of the debt adjustment from the “desired” pattern has also been modeled
by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and more recently by Beetsma and Mavromatis (2014).
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These papers have modeled the distortion brought by the political decision process in the
debt build up. In this paper we just assume that unbiased deviations may occur, due to
valuation effects (exchange rates, change in the price of assets abroad...). In our model, the
key source of distortion is the Panglossian effect which tilts the incentives of policymakers
towards more debt.
Combining equations (16) and (17), we therefore get:
Dˆt+1 = a6 + a7 Dˆt − a8 gt+1Dˆt + a9 pit+1|t (g+t+1|t − g−t+1|t) + εdt+1 (18)
where a6, a7, a8 and a9 are obvious to deduce from (16) and (17). Equation (18) will be used
in the empirical section 6 as the basis for the debt dynamics.
They novelty introduced by our model is the factor a9 pit+1|t (g+t+1|t−g−t+1|t) (the remaining
terms are consistent with a variety of models). Let us emphasize its role and where it comes
from. The core idea of the model presented above is the Panglossian factor which states
that a borrower tends to truncate its vision of the future to the subset of events in which
it will remain solvent. Therefore, a positive driving force of the decision to borrow is the
discrepancy between the average growth of the economy and the prevailing growth rate in
the better states of nature where the country remains solvent. Writing the average growth
rate as g¯ = (1− pit+1|t)g+t+1|t + pit+1|t g−t+1|t, the Panglossian term that we factor in is simply:
g+t+1|t − g¯ = pit+1|t(g+t+1|t − g−t+1|t). The larger it is, the more debt the country is willing to
take, ceteris paribus. This is the key factor that we now bring to the data.
5. Dataset
Our empirical strategy relies on a dataset of “debt distress” and “normal times” episodes,
following the methodology of Kraay and Nehru (2006).
More precisely, for a given year, a country is considered to be in debt crisis if at least one
of the following three conditions holds:
1. The country receives debt relief from the Paris Club in the form of a rescheduling
and/or a debt reduction.
2. The sum of its principal and interest in arrears is large relative to the outstanding debt
stock.
3. The country receives substantial balance of payments support from the IMF through
a non-concessional Standby Arrangement (SBA) or an Extended Fund Facility (EFF).
For the last two conditions, we choose the same thresholds as do Kraay and Nehru (2006):
a country is considered to be in crisis if its arrears are above 5% of the total stock of its
outstanding debt, or if the total amount agreed to under SBA/EFF arrangements is above
50% of the country’s IMF quota. Moreover, a country receiving Paris Club relief for a given
year is also considered to be in crisis for the following two years since the relief decision is
typically based on three-years balance of payments projections by the IMF.4
4The following data sources are used for creating the dataset:
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The set of countries over which are made the computations consists of the 135 developing
countries defined by the World Bank, from which we removed the 38 countries that have
absolutely no access to private financial markets.5 We choose to remove them since their
situation of indebtedness is somewhat different from that of the rest of the developing world
(in particular, they have a much higher proportion of concessional lending). From the stand-
point of the model, they probably fall into the category of countries that have no access to
risky markets, and their debt dynamics must consequently be different.
We are therefore left with a sample of 97 countries. From the time angle, our data cover
the period 1970–2004.
Prior to the elimination of certain observations in our econometric estimations (due to
missing data), our sample of episodes consists of 70 distress episodes, and 223 normal times
episodes.6 The average default episode lasts 13.3 years and exhibits a GDP loss from peak
to through of 1.9%.7
In one regression (column (5) of Table 1, p. 21) we extend the data to include the most
recent financial crises (up to 2011), although the nature of the post-Lehman financial crisis
is not quite that of the proposed model.
To summarize, the differences between our dataset and that of Kraay and Nehru are
twofold: first, we update their data to 2004, which is relatively minor but allows us to
• the World Bank’s Global Development Finance for data on debt levels and payment arrears (World
Bank, 2006a);
• the Paris Club website for information on debt reliefs (http://www.clubdeparis.org);
• the IMF’s International Financial Statistics for data on SBA/EFF commitments (International Mon-
etary Fund, 2006);
• the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for general macroeconomic variables (World Bank,
2006b);
• the Penn World Table for data on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) variables (Heston et al., 2006).
5We define market access as in Gelos et al. (2004, 2011). The countries we removed are those that never
accessed international credit markets between 1980 and 2000, in accordance with the authors’ definition.
The complete country list can be found on page 29 of Gelos et al. (2004).
6As visible in Table A.4 of Appendix A, the Argentina default of 2001 is not present in our sample. This
is because, as Kraay and Nehru (2006), we require that a crisis episode be preceded by three years without
a crisis (in order to ensure exogeneity of regressors). In this specific case, Argentina is in crisis according
to our criteria between 1983 and 1995, then between 1998 and 2009. The two year delay (1996 and 1997)
between the two crisis episodes does not fulfill our criteria, and the second episode is therefore excluded from
the database.
7One could argue that our third criterion for detecting episodes of distress (the balance of payments
support by the IMF) does not characterize an outright default that has the potential of destroying a country’s
fundamentals. We therefore computed statistics on default episodes where only the first two criteria (arrears
of payment and Paris club) are used. The number of default episodes is then 68, against 314 normal times
episodes. The average default episode duration is 14.3 years, and the loss of GDP from peak to through is
1.6%. The fact that these statistics are similar to those of our main dataset shows that the IMF support
criterion is not the main determinant behind the construction of our dataset of default episodes.
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include the Ecuadorian debt crisis of 2000 for instance. Second, we restrict our analysis to
the emerging countries that have access to private credit markets.
The interested reader can refer to Cohen and Valadier (2011) for additional insights on
a very close dataset and for various descriptive statistics and econometric results extracted
from it.
Another dataset of interest is that of Standard & Poor’s (Beers and Chambers, 2006). It
contains fewer events (59 ones), which are more severe than ours (when analyzed through
the magnitude of GDP fall). Our database can then be thought of as debt distress rather
than strict default as in the more demanding S&P database.
6. The econometric model
6.1. The estimated equations
Our empirical framework is given by the following system of three simultaneous equations.
Since these three equations exhibit a circular dependency, there is an identification issue,
which is dealt with in the following section.
dit = X
d
i,t−1 η
d + gitX
d,g
i,t−1 η
d,g + εdit (19)
git = X
g
i,t−1 η
g + δitX
g,δ
i,t−1 η
g,δ + εgit (20)
δit = 1{Xδi,t−1 ηδ+ditXδ,di,t−1 ηδ,d+εδit>0} (21)
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, dit is the debt-to-GDP ratio, git is the percentage
year-on-year growth rate of nominal US$ GDP, δit is a dummy indicating a debt crisis; the
various components of Xi,t−1 = (Xdi,t−1, X
d,g
i,t−1, X
g
i,t−1, X
g,δ
i,t−1, X
δ
i,t−1, X
δ,d
i,t−1) are row vectors of
exogenous variables and the various components of η = (ηd, ηd,g, ηg, ηg,δ, ηδ, ηδ,d) are column
vectors of parameters of corresponding sizes; εdit, ε
g
it, and ε
δ
it are stochastic exogenous shocks.
Equation (19) reflects the theoretical debt dynamics equation (18), and the shock εdit
is therefore interpreted as a unforeseen deviation from the Euler equation, for the reasons
explained in section 4.4.
In the growth equation (20), the shock εgit is the driver of the country’s growth exogenous
uncertainty. Depending on the occurrence of a debt crisis, growth can be endogenously
reduced, as captured by the incidence of the δit variable on growth.
Finally, in the debt crisis equation (21), the shock εδit corresponds to the variability of
the threshold level of debt default; it is the empirical counterpart of the shock on λt in the
theoretical model, since this latter variable has an impact on the default threshold.8 We
have already referred to this shock as the market shock (see definition 3): it represents the
ability of market investors to divert country resources in case of default, and more generally
8As can be seen from proposition 3 in Appendix B.1.
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it captures market nervousness on property rights, contagion effects, and global financial
crises.9
The following normal distribution is assumed for the three shocks (which in addition are
supposed to be independent and identically distributed over periods and countries): εditεgit
εδit
 N
 00
0
 ,
 σ2d 0 00 σ2g 0
0 0 1

Since equation (21) which defines the crisis dummy is essentially a probit, its identifiability
is guaranteed by setting the variance of εδit to unity.
6.2. Identification and multiple equilibria
Since there is a circular dependency between the three endogenous variables, the econo-
metric model cannot be identified at this stage. Indeed, for a given set of exogenous Xi,t−1
and for a given draw of the random variables εdit, ε
g
it and ε
δ
it, the model does not rule out
the possibility of having two vectors (dit, git, δit) satisfying equations (19), (20) and (21): of
these two vectors, one would be a no-crisis scenario (δit = 0), and the other a crisis scenario
(δit = 1). This feature is precisely the possibility of multiple equilibria that we are trying to
modelize.
Let g0it and d
0
it be the growth and the debt-to-GDP ratio conditional to no crisis occurring
(δit = 0). Conversely, let g
1
it and d
1
it be the growth and the debt-to-GDP ratio conditional to
a crisis occurring (δit = 1). We shall refer to d
0
it as to “pre-crisis” debt level and to d
1
it as to
“post-crisis” level.
With these notations, a solution to equations (19), (20) and (21) is either (d0it, g
0
it, 0) or
(d1it, g
1
it, 1).
In order to address the identification issue, a stochastic variable (with only two possible
values) is introduced, which determines which equilibrium to choose: it is a sunspot variable,
as it is sometimes called in the literature, i.e. a variable with no relation to economic fun-
damentals but which makes agents coordinate on one equilibrium when several are possible.
We therefore introduce a fourth random variable ζit following a Bernoulli distribution of
parameter p (that is: P(ζit = 1) = p and P(ζit = 0) = 1− p). The variable ζit is the sunspot
whose role is to discriminate between the two equilibria when both are possible.
Given these extensions, it is now possible to describe how the model behaves. We assume
that the parameter restrictions described in Appendix C are satisfied. Then, for a given set
of exogenous Xi,t−1, and for a given draw of random variables εdit, ε
g
it, ε
δ
it and ζit, only three
cases are possible:
• The crisis equilibrium, inexorably driven by economic fundamentals, occurs when the
crisis indicator is lighted at the pre-crisis debt levels d0it, i.e. when : X
δ
i,t−1η
δ +
9Of course, this shock captures all omitted variables in the debt crisis equation. But since we already
control for the effect of debt and growth, we argue that a large fraction of the variance of that residual is
explained by factors outside the control of the country, and therefore mostly market-related.
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d0itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit > 0. In that case, a no-crisis equilibrium is impossible, and be-
cause of equations (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5), one has Xδi,t−1η
δ +d1itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit > 0, i.e.
a crisis is triggered.
• The no-crisis equilibrium occurs when the crisis indicator is off even at the (worst) post-
crisis debt levels d1it, i.e. when: X
δ
i,t−1η
δ + d1itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit < 0. A crisis equilibrium
is impossible, and because of equations (C.3), (C.4) and (C.5), one has Xδi,t−1η
δ +
d0itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit < 0, i.e. no crisis occurs.
• The multiple equilibria case, when Xδi,t−1ηδ + d1itXδ,di,t−1ηδ,d + εδit > 0 > Xδi,t−1ηδ +
d0itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit. Both equilibria are possible: at pre-crisis level it is avoided, at
post-crisis level it is triggered. The outcome is given by the sunspot: δit = ζit (and git
and dit are set accordingly, i.e. git = g
δit
it and dit = d
δit
it ). A self-fulfilling crisis occurs
if ζit = 1: it could have been avoided had the sunspot had been different, since the
fundamentals are compatible with a no-crisis equilibrium.
We model the risk of multiple equilibria as the risk that the good growth regime is turned
into the bad growth one. The good growth regime can only be sustained when debt is low,
the other one when the debt is high. But being on a “high” or “low” debt path is itself
dependent on the growth regime, hence the risk of multiple equilibria. Given the fact that
debt is paid out of GDP at large, we focus on growth of income rather than on income per
head.
The derivation of the likelihood function of the model can be found in Appendix D.
6.3. Estimating the self-fulfilling effect
The econometric model presented in sections 6.1 and 6.2 is estimated with full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) on the dataset of debt crisis episodes presented in section 5.
Details about the estimation procedure can be found in Appendix E.
Table 1 reports the results for various specifications. The present section discusses only
columns (1) and (2); the remaining ones will be discussed in the following section.
All exogenous variables are taken in t − 2 (i.e. two years before the beginning of the
episode). The parameter p governing the self-fulfilling risk is calibrated: its estimation has
not been possible with a reasonable accuracy. Two different values have been used for its
calibration: p = 1, which reflects the assumption that, when two equilibria are possible, the
market always chooses the worst of the two; and p = 0.5, which means that, when there is
a possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis, a coin is flipped and the crisis takes place half of the
time.
The first panel of the table reports the debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics (equation (19)), the
second panel reports the growth dynamics (equation (20)), and the third panel reports the
crisis probability (equation (21)).
The current debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by past debt-to-GDP ratio and by the in-
teraction of current growth with past debt-to-GDP ratio (under the category ηd,g). This
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Table 1: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Debt/GDP ratio dynamics
ηd: Debt/GDP (t− 2) 1.204*** 1.205*** 1.104*** 1.104*** 1.021***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.075) (0.073) (0.143)
ηd: Crisis prob × Growth gap gˆ (t/t− 2) 0.821** 0.825** 1.544*
(0.262) (0.266) (0.746)
ηd: Growth (t− 2) − Mean Growth (t− 2/t− 4) -0.017
(0.212)
ηd,g: Debt/GDP (t− 2) × Growth (t) -1.722*** -1.719*** -1.651*** -1.669*** -1.492***
(0.214) (0.210) (0.320) (0.317) (0.453)
σd 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.120***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Growth dynamics
ηg: Log per capita PPP real GDP (t− 2) -0.023** -0.025** -0.023** -0.023** -0.026***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ηg: Growth (t− 2) 0.281** 0.277** 0.281** 0.278** 0.298***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.086) (0.087) (0.083)
ηg: Constant 0.268*** 0.290*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.294***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060) (0.054)
ηg,δ: Debt crisis dummy (t) -0.059*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.061***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
σg 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.092***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Debt crisis determinants
ηδ: Log per capita PPP real GDP (t-2) -0.365** -0.426** -0.356** -0.363** -0.340**
(0.132) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) (0.124)
ηδ: US$ GDP / PPP GDP (t-2) 1.477** 1.582** 1.454** 1.475** 1.128*
(0.535) (0.530) (0.525) (0.525) (0.537)
ηδ: Constant 0.237 0.705 0.202 0.261 0.468
(1.071) (1.070) (1.085) (1.084) (0.974)
ηδ,d: Debt/GDP (t) 2.883*** 2.971*** 2.815*** 2.801*** 2.113***
(0.456) (0.465) (0.429) (0.430) (0.362)
Calibrated parameter
p: Sunspot Bernoulli parameter 1.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000
Self-fulfilling probability 0.111 0.077 0.111 0.110 0.086
Self-enforcing probability 0.124 0.124 0.157
Number of observations 253 253 251 248 288
Log-likelihood 301.683 300.872 306.744 300.338 353.093
AIC -579.366 -577.744 -587.489 -572.675 -680.186
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second term is meant to capture the accounting effect of growth in the denominator of the
debt-to-GDP ratio.
Current growth is explained by three factors: past growth, the occurrence of a crisis—
which lowers the level of growth by a constant amount—, and the level of real GDP per
capita—in order to capture the international convergence effect.
The occurrence or not of a debt crisis is explained by the current debt-to-GDP ratio, the
level of real GDP per capita, and the overvaluation of the exchange rate (measured as the
ratio of GDP expressed in current US$ to GDP expressed in international PPP US$). The
level of real GDP per capita is included because richer countries seem to exhibit less crises in
the data; the overvaluation of the exchange rate is meant to capture the fact that currency
misalignment increases the risk of a currency crisis which in turn increases the risk of a debt
crisis, since debt is generally denominated in foreign currency.
In Table 1, one can see in columns (1) and (2) that most of the parameters of interest
are estimated with the expected sign and with a good accuracy.
As expected, the debt dynamics exhibits high inertia (the coefficient on past debt-to-
GDP is close to unity), and the interaction of current growth with past debt-to-GDP ratio
has a strong effect (with a coefficient close to −2, which is logical given the fact that lagged
variables are taken two periods in the past).
The growth dynamics has some serial auto-correlation, though not very high. The con-
vergence effect of poor countries clearly appears. And, as expected, a debt crisis lowers the
level of growth by more than 5% on average.
The estimators for the determinants of debt crises are also consistent: debt crises are made
more likely by a high current debt-to-GDP ratio, low real income level and overvaluation of
the domestic currency.
In addition to the results of parameter estimations, the tables also report information
about the percentage of crises that were of a self-fulfilling nature. Indeed, with this econo-
metric model, it is possible for a given crisis to compute the a posteriori probability that
it was of a self-fulfilling nature, by opposition to being solely driven by fundamentals and
exogenous shocks (see below section 6.5). The line entitled “Self-fulfilling probability” in the
tables reports the mean of that probability over all the crises in the dataset. In column (1)
where p is calibrated to 1—that is, when the markets are considered as “panic prone”—about
11% of debt crises are reported as being self-fulfilling. In column (2), where p is calibrated
to 0.5, the proportion of self-fulfilling crises is consistently almost halved, being around 7%.
6.4. Estimating the Panglossian effect
Since our theoretical model predicts that some countries will adopt a prudent behavior
while others will accumulate debt, ignoring the risk of a crisis in the Panglossian mode (see
section 4.3), this hypothesis is tested in the data. More precisely, using equation (15), we
construct a proxy variable for the Panglossian effect which we define as piit(g
+
it − g−it ); this
expression is then introduced as an explanatory variable in the debt dynamics equation (18).
The first step for constructing this variable consists in estimating piit, the probability of a
debt crisis for country i at date t, given variables in t− 2. For that purpose, a simple probit
is estimated on the dataset of episodes, where the probability of a debt crisis is a function of
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several exogenous variables.10 This makes it possible to compute at every date the probability
of a debt crisis two periods ahead, as predicted by the probit model, independently of the
actual realization or not of a crisis.11
The second step consists in estimating the growth gap gˆit = g
+
it − g−it , i.e. the expected
growth conditionally on no crisis occurring minus the expected growth conditionally on a
crisis occurring. For a given piit, the corresponding growth gap g
+
it − g−it is approximated by
taking the mean growth rate (across the whole data sample) above and below the quantile
piit.
12
The Panglossian variable thus constructed is used in the estimations of columns (3)
and (4) of Table 1. Note that since the Panglossian effect is a generated regressor, the
standard errors of the parameter estimates—as generated by the FIML estimator—need to
be corrected to take into account the sampling error of the first step probit. For that purpose,
we implemented the generic method proposed by Murphy and Topel (1985) for two stage
maximum likelihood estimation.
The estimation reported in column (3) shows that the Panglossian effect enters in the
debt dynamics equation, consistently with the theoretical model. Its coefficient has the
expected sign and is significant at the 0.2% level.
The table also reports information about the percentage of crises that are of a self-
enforcing nature, i.e. that are the direct consequence of the Panglossian effect. More pre-
cisely, after having canceled the self-fulfilling effect, one can compute the probability that a
crisis would not have occurred if the Panglossian effect had not been operative between t−2
and t. The self-fulfilling and the self-enforcing probabilities thus computed are additive by
construction. This leads, on average, to a self-enforcing probability of about 12%.
Note that the self-enforcing probabilities reported here only take into account the impact
of the Panglossian effect between dates t− 2 and t. In section 6.6 below we present another
quantitative measure of the importance of the Panglossian effect, taking into account its
cumulative effect over a longer period.
Robustness checks are also performed in order to show that what is measured with the
10Those variables are: the debt-to-GDP ratio, the log of per capita real PPP GDP, the total debt service-
to-exports ratio and the overvaluation of the exchange rate (measured by US$ GDP to PPP GDP ratio).
All exogenous are taken two years before the beginning of the episode. The methodology is exactly that of
Kraay and Nehru (2006), using a slightly different set of exogenous variables.
11One possible criticism against this methodology is that the crisis probability as defined by a probit is not
consistent with the crisis probability as defined by the larger system of simultaneous equations. The main
reason for adopting this methodology is that estimating a model-consistent probability is a very difficult
problem from a computational point of view: it involves the computation of a fixed point in the maximum
likelihood estimation, and there is no well-known methodology for computing the standard errors of the
coefficients thus estimated. From an economic point of view, the methodology that we adopt is equivalent to
the hypothesis that agents in the economy only know the probit model, but not the simultaneous equations
model, and use the probit model to form their expectations about the future. This hypothesis is not fully
satisfactory, but can nevertheless be justified by the fact that crisis forecasting is generally done with very
simple models, as the probit one, both in policy institutions and in credit rating agencies.
12Note that this method is rigorously exact when a common factor drives (up to uncorrelated disturbances)
the determinant of growth and that of the probability of default.
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Panglossian variable is indeed the effect exhibited in the theoretical model and not a proxy
for another economic mechanism.
One may argue that the Panglossian variable is simply a proxy for “bad news,” and that
the increase in debt that is measured when such a bad news occurs would also be predicted
by standard inter-temporal consumption smoothing. To test that hypothesis, we construct a
measure of the business cycle, equal to growth in t−2 minus mean growth over t−4 to t−2.
If the inter-temporal consumption smoothing hypothesis was true, this variable should enter
in the debt dynamics, since it captures temporary shocks. On the contrary, the results in
column (4) show that this variable is not significant and does not diminish the explanatory
power of the Panglossian variable.
We also performed other robustness checks not reported on Table 1, but available upon
request. First, one may argue that what is captured in the Panglossian effect is simply the
mechanical effect of the risk premium asked by investors when the level of risk is higher. We
therefore tested the Panglossian variable against the variable piit
Di,t−2
Qi,t−2
, which is a proxy for the
risk premium effect (since the risk premium is supposed to be highly correlated with the crisis
probability). The results show that the Panglossian variable remains significant—though at
a lower level—while the risk premium variable is not significant and has the wrong sign.
Secondly, following Moral-Benito (2012) who shows that the most robust determinants to
growth are the price of investment goods, distance to major world cities, and political rights,
we tested the explanatory power of those variables in the growth equation of specification
(3). It turns out that none of these three variables is significant in our estimation, whether
taken collectively or individually, and that the quantitative and qualitative results of our
baseline estimation remain essentially unchanged.
Finally, in column (5) we present estimates of the same model, with data including the
latest financial crisis (up to 2011). The point estimate of the coefficient of the Panglossian
effect is larger, although less accurately measured. Although the results do not reject our
(pre-Lehman) model of sovereign risk, more work is clearly needed to account for the specific
way by which the Lehman/Greek crisis has differentially affected the sovereign bond market.
We also tried additional robustness check, by incorporating other measures of debt crisis
such as the S&P data base. Our results (available on request) show that a default, in the
S&P definition, entails a larger (negative) economic impact, with identical debt dynamics
almost unchanged with respect to the results presented here.
6.5. A posteriori self-fulfilling probabilities
For each crisis in the sample, it is possible to compute the a posteriori probability that
it was self-fulfilling.13 The results of this computation are given in Table 2. The crises are
ordered by their likelihood of being self-fulfilling episodes. The probabilities are computed
on the basis of specification (3) in Table 1. Note that in this specification, the self-fulfilling
parameter p is calibrated to 1; a lower value would give correspondingly lower self-fulfilling
probabilities. The values reported can therefore be considered as upper bounds of the real
13See Appendix D for the methodological details.
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probabilities. Also note that, for the crises that start after 2002, the reported probabilities
have been computed off-sample (because specification (3) in Table 1 incorporates only crises
up to 2002).
Table 2: Individual crises self-fulfilling probabilities
Country Year Crisis length Self-fulfill prob. (in %)
Jordan 1989 16 0.2
Somalia 1981 24 1.4
Rwanda 1994 11 1.4
Congo, Rep. 1985 20 1.6
Nigeria 1986 19 1.9
Cote d’Ivoire 1981 16 3.1
Guinea-Bissau 1981 23 3.7
Benin 2009 3 3.8
Madagascar 1980 25 4.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1976 29 4.6
Turkey 1978 7 4.6
Uruguay 1983 4 5.0
Ethiopia 1991 14 5.1
Benin 1983 16 5.4
Benin 1970 9 5.9
Chile 1983 7 6.5
India 1981 3 6.6
Dominican Republic 2003 5 7.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977 4 7.8
Uruguay 2002 3 7.9
Mexico 1983 10 8.0
Sudan 1977 28 9.0
Gabon 1986 19 9.1
Peru 1977 4 9.9
Ghana 1970 7 10.0
Solomon Islands 2002 3 10.3
Brazil 1998 7 10.3
Kenya 1975 3 10.6
Pakistan 1972 5 10.8
Senegal 1980 23 10.8
Philippines 1976 3 10.9
Paraguay 1986 9 11.5
Continued on next page
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Country Year Crisis length Self-fulfill prob. (in %)
Brazil 1983 3 11.6
Niger 1983 22 11.9
Ecuador 2000 5 12.4
Dominica 2005 5 12.5
Kenya 1992 5 12.6
Bangladesh 1979 3 12.9
Honduras 1979 23 13.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984 12 13.0
Colombia 1999 3 13.2
Ukraine 2008 3 13.4
Dominican Republic 1983 17 14.2
Sri Lanka 2005 3 14.5
Turkey 1999 6 14.5
Kenya 2000 3 14.7
Indonesia 1970 3 14.7
Ecuador 1983 14 14.8
Jamaica 1977 24 14.9
Comoros 1987 18 15.2
Tunisia 1986 6 15.3
Ghana 1996 3 15.5
Algeria 1994 4 15.7
Chile 1972 5 15.8
Morocco 1980 15 15.9
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 5 16.0
Thailand 1997 3 16.3
Costa Rica 1980 16 16.3
Cameroon 1987 18 16.6
Pakistan 1980 4 17.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 3 18.1
Pakistan 1994 10 18.7
Venezuela, RB 1989 4 19.3
Indonesia 1997 8 19.6
El Salvador 1990 3 19.9
Argentina 1983 13 20.3
In words, the Jordan crisis of 1989 or the Rwandan crisis of 1994 were almost surely not
created by a self-fulfilling process. They could not have been avoided by simply restoring
confidence.
In contrast, the crises of Argentina in 1983, El Salvador in 1990 or Indonesia in 1997 may
have been self-fulfilling. There is about one chance in five that they could have been avoided
if confidence had been maintained and panic avoided.
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6.6. Simulating the model
We now turn to the simulation of the estimated model. The strategy is to simulate
the dynamic model described by equations (19), (20) and (21) over several periods, for a
given trajectory of the random draws (εdit, ε
g
it, ε
δ
it) and of the exogenous values Xit, given the
estimated parameters η.
More precisely, we simulate the specification reported in column (3) of Table 1, for given
values of both the set of exogenous and of parameters (as obtained by maximum-likelihood
estimation). The log of per capital PPP real GDP and of the US$ GDP to PPP GDP
ratio are set constant across time and equal to the sample mean. The starting point of the
simulations is a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%. The probability piit used for the Panglossian
effect is recomputed at each period, using the simple probit described in section 6.4. We
simulate 2500 series of 5 periods (i.e. of 10 years, since lagged variables are taken 2 years
earlier).
The dynamics of the model are affected by four shocks that may be switched off for
comparison purposes: shocks to the law of motion of debt (εdit), to growth (ε
g
it), to the crisis
equation (εδit), plus the sunspot (ζit). We also consider simulations where the Panglossian
effect is switched off (just by removing the corresponding term in the debt equation). Thus,
there is a total of 25 = 32 possible combinations according to whether some of these five
effects are activated or not.
When the five effects are activated, 89.4% of the simulations exhibit a crisis episode in at
least one of the 5 simulation periods. This high occurrence rate of crisis is the consequence
of the relatively high level of the debt-to-GDP ratio that has been chosen as the starting
point for simulations.
In order to compute the contribution of each of these five effects to these crises, each of
them is shut off one by one, and we observe by how much the number of crises diminishes,
which gives the contribution of each one.14
Table 3 reports the contribution of each effect so computed: it shows the percentage of
crisis episodes that can be considered as a direct consequence of each effect.
One can see that the largest contributor is the market shock εδit which explains more than
55% of crises. This shows that if there was a known and deterministic debt-to-GDP threshold
above which default occurs, then the risk of a debt crisis would be more than halved. The
remaining 45% of crises are directly due to the law of motion of the country’s debt ratio.
Within that category, the Panglossian effect (12%) is of the same order of magnitude as
the debt shock (15%), which means that the “strategic” accumulation of excessive debt is
about as important as the uncontrolled part of this accumulation. The lack of predictability
of growth (11%) is also of the same order of magnitude as the Panglossian effect. In our
simulations, the self-fulfilling part of the debt crises comes last (6%); although this is the
lesser part of our decomposition, it nevertheless represents more than half of the risk that is
due to the vagaries of the growth rate.
14An issue is that the results depend on the order in which the effects are shut down: this problem is solved
by making these computations for the 5! = 120 possible orders, and by computing the average contributions.
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Table 3: Simulated contributions of shocks and Panglossian effect to crises
Effect Contribution
Market shock (εδit) 55.8%
Debt shock (εdit) 15.2%
Panglossian effect 12.0%
Growth shock (εgit) 11.0%
Self-fulfilling effect (ζit) 6.1%
Total 100.0%
Monte Carlo simulations of the estimated model (column (3) of Table 1). Results computed over
2,500 simulations of a 10-year duration and starting from a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%.
7. Conclusion
We have tried to distinguish two attitudes towards debt: the attitude of prudent borrow-
ers, who attempt to stabilize their debt at low levels, even in the event of an adverse shock,
and Panglossian borrowers, who only take into account the best scenarios possible, ratio-
nally anticipating to default on their debt if hit by an unfavorable shock (or by a sequence
of them). We have shown empirically that this distinction is consistent with the data.
We also have distinguished two types of debt crises: those that are the effect of an ex-
ogenous shock, and those that are created in a self-fulfilling manner by the financial markets
themselves. We have shown that the large majority of crises are of the first kind, although
the probability of self-fulfilling cases is not negligible.
These results have a few policy implications that we leave to future work. For one thing,
if the earthquake model is correct, then there is room for improving the stability of finan-
cial markets by the use of more conditional sovereign lending, contingent on other lenders
following suit. It indeed remains a question to understand why sovereign debt arrangements
contain so few contingency clauses.
Regarding the self-fulfilling case, if our results can be trusted, while the now old debate
on sovereign debt restructuring remains important, it may be relatively less so than finding
more innovative sources of financing.
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Appendix A. Debt crises
Tables A.4 and A.5 present the complete list of the crisis episodes identified according to
the methodology of section 5.
In Table A.4, for each crisis episode, the first three columns give the country, the year of
the crisis outbreak, and the number of years it lasted. The columns labeled “Type of crisis”
tell whether the crisis was characterized by a Paris Club relief, accumulated arrears or IMF
intervention (or several of these options). The last column is the debt-to-GDP ratio at three
points in time (3 years before the outbreak, in the year of the outbreak and three years later)
Table A.5 gives other macroeconomic indicators about the country: the debt-to-PPP-
GDP ratio (at the same three points in time), the debt service-to-exports ratio, the mean
annual growth before the crisis and the mean effective interest rate charged on the debt
before the crisis.
Table A.4: List of crisis episodes (with debt indicators)
Country Year Length Type of crisis D/GDP
Paris Club Arrears SBA/EFF t− 3 t t+ 3
Indonesia 1970 3 Y N N 46.9 46.9 42.3
Benin 1970 9 N Y N 12.5 12.5 11.7
Ghana 1970 7 N Y N 25.8 25.8 30.6
Guinea 1970 35 Y Y Y NA NA NA
Chile 1972 5 Y Y Y 33.1 30.7 76.4
Pakistan 1972 5 Y N N 34.0 43.7 50.7
Tanzania 1972 33 Y Y Y NA NA NA
Kenya 1975 3 N N Y 27.6 39.6 41.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1976 29 Y Y Y 13.2 30.2 30.0
Philippines 1976 3 N N Y 27.4 35.3 48.3
Jamaica 1977 24 Y Y Y 60.4 51.7 71.4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977 4 N N Y 24.5 80.2 83.5
Peru 1977 4 Y N Y 38.8 64.4 45.4
Sudan 1977 28 Y Y Y 28.9 35.1 68.0
Panama 1978 3 N N Y 50.4 93.8 77.7
Turkey 1978 7 Y N Y 10.9 22.3 28.9
Honduras 1979 23 Y Y Y 27.1 52.6 63.5
Continued on next page
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Country Year Length Type of crisis D/GDP
Paris Club Arrears SBA/EFF t− 3 t t+ 3
Bangladesh 1979 3 N N Y 19.8 19.5 28.0
Mauritius 1979 3 N N Y NA NA 53.3
Costa Rica 1980 16 Y Y Y 42.9 56.8 133.1
Madagascar 1980 25 Y Y Y 33.1 30.6 57.9
Senegal 1980 23 Y Y Y 31.7 49.3 83.8
Morocco 1980 15 Y Y Y 50.8 51.7 93.5
Pakistan 1980 4 Y N Y 50.0 41.9 41.9
India 1981 3 N N Y 12.4 12.1 16.5
Romania 1981 5 Y N Y NA NA NA
Cote d’Ivoire 1981 16 Y Y Y 48.6 96.5 124.9
Guinea-Bissau 1981 23 Y Y N 43.9 97.8 183.1
Somalia 1981 24 Y Y Y 91.8 151.0 190.0
Argentina 1983 13 Y Y Y 35.3 44.2 47.3
Niger 1983 22 Y Y Y 34.4 52.7 74.3
Benin 1983 16 Y Y N 30.2 68.1 74.0
Brazil 1983 3 Y N Y 30.4 48.5 40.7
Chile 1983 7 Y N Y 43.8 90.7 119.3
Dominican Republic 1983 17 Y Y Y 30.2 34.0 60.2
Ecuador 1983 14 Y Y Y 50.4 67.9 90.5
Mexico 1983 10 Y N Y 29.5 62.5 77.9
Uruguay 1983 4 N N Y 16.4 64.8 66.7
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984 12 Y Y Y 94.3 105.1 109.0
Congo, Rep. 1985 20 Y Y Y 91.8 141.2 184.9
Lebanon 1986 6 N Y N NA NA 37.7
Sao Tome and Principe 1986 19 Y Y N 83.9 122.9 291.9
Gabon 1986 19 Y Y Y 27.0 57.1 80.0
Nigeria 1986 19 Y Y Y 50.2 109.9 126.3
Paraguay 1986 9 N Y N 25.2 58.9 54.6
Tunisia 1986 6 N N Y 48.6 65.9 69.0
Cameroon 1987 18 Y Y Y 37.2 37.9 59.7
Comoros 1987 18 N Y N 97.5 103.5 71.8
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 5 Y Y Y 19.6 46.7 46.7
Vietnam 1988 17 Y Y Y 0.4 2.4 243.4
Jordan 1989 16 Y Y Y 78.2 177.2 150.0
Venezuela, RB 1989 4 N N Y 58.3 76.8 64.7
El Salvador 1990 3 Y N N 50.2 44.8 29.3
Seychelles 1990 15 N Y N 69.4 49.7 38.7
Continued on next page
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Country Year Length Type of crisis D/GDP
Paris Club Arrears SBA/EFF t− 3 t t+ 3
Ethiopia 1991 14 Y Y N 99.9 95.8 181.7
Kenya 1992 5 Y Y N 71.2 83.9 80.8
Algeria 1994 4 Y N Y 62.3 71.1 64.5
Rwanda 1994 11 Y Y N 42.4 126.6 60.1
Pakistan 1994 10 Y N Y 51.4 52.8 48.2
Ghana 1996 3 Y N N 76.7 83.6 83.3
Indonesia 1997 8 Y Y Y 61.0 63.1 87.5
Thailand 1997 3 N N Y 45.3 72.7 64.9
Brazil 1998 7 N N Y 22.8 30.7 45.5
Colombia 1999 3 N N Y 29.7 39.9 40.7
Turkey 1999 6 N N Y 44.1 55.6 71.3
Kenya 2000 3 Y N N 49.3 48.4 45.6
Ecuador 2000 5 Y N Y 65.2 86.0 62.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 3 Y N N 139.0 115.3 NA
Solomon Islands 2002 3 N Y N 49.7 79.5 NA
Uruguay 2002 3 N N Y 35.3 86.4 NA
Dominican Republic 2003 5 Y N Y 19.4 34.2 25.6
Dominica 2005 5 N Y N 76.1 76.7 67.2
Sri Lanka 2005 3 Y N N 57.2 47.0 38.6
Ukraine 2008 3 N Y Y 39.1 54.6 82.8
Benin 2009 3 N Y NA 13.8 20.0 27.2
Table A.5: List of crisis episodes (with other macro indicators)
Country Year D/PPP-GDP TDS/X Growth Interest rate
t− 3 t t+ 3 t− 3 . . . t− 1 t− 3 . . . t− 1
Indonesia 1970 16.0 16.0 16.0 13.0 6.9 1.0
Benin 1970 5.7 5.7 6.0 3.4 2.6 1.0
Ghana 1970 12.6 12.6 13.4 10.8 3.2 2.1
Guinea 1970 14.6 14.6 22.8 NA NA 1.3
Chile 1972 17.2 17.5 27.6 27.3 4.9 3.5
Pakistan 1972 14.5 14.8 14.3 33.2 5.8 2.0
Tanzania 1972 8.6 49.4 63.7 NA NA 0.9
Kenya 1975 12.0 21.3 23.6 8.6 9.0 3.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1976 9.8 28.9 26.0 9.2 2.1 3.4
Philippines 1976 7.3 11.2 16.9 22.5 6.0 3.3
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Country Year D/PPP-GDP TDS/X Growth Interest rate
t− 3 t t+ 3 t− 3 . . . t− 1 t− 3 . . . t− 1
Jamaica 1977 43.8 41.8 43.2 37.2 -3.7 6.9
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977 7.3 26.0 25.9 16.3 8.7 1.7
Peru 1977 19.7 27.0 18.6 42.5 4.9 5.0
Sudan 1977 18.7 29.2 46.1 12.7 14.6 1.8
Panama 1978 30.2 53.5 47.8 NA 1.5 4.4
Turkey 1978 9.2 19.3 18.2 19.1 7.0 5.6
Honduras 1979 13.2 28.1 33.4 29.1 10.3 5.1
Bangladesh 1979 5.0 5.4 6.7 28.8 5.1 1.9
Mauritius 1979 2.7 12.0 14.9 NA NA 3.3
Costa Rica 1980 20.6 31.5 43.8 22.0 6.7 5.0
Madagascar 1980 18.4 24.3 32.2 37.7 3.2 2.5
Senegal 1980 15.8 29.6 31.2 7.1 0.1 3.8
Morocco 1980 24.6 29.6 30.6 19.1 4.4 4.8
Pakistan 1980 14.8 12.7 10.6 31.9 5.3 2.5
India 1981 4.2 4.0 4.5 16.1 2.4 2.7
Romania 1981 1.9 13.5 7.8 NA NA 4.3
Cote d’Ivoire 1981 37.6 62.3 47.5 16.4 0.8 6.5
Guinea-Bissau 1981 22.9 44.9 67.5 10.5 -0.3 1.0
Somalia 1981 16.1 27.3 36.2 3.0 -1.0 0.3
Argentina 1983 15.9 23.7 24.6 107.4 -2.2 8.8
Niger 1983 23.4 19.0 26.9 22.9 -0.0 9.2
Benin 1983 21.5 30.8 29.3 9.1 6.3 3.0
Brazil 1983 15.2 18.9 15.1 69.4 1.8 12.1
Chile 1983 29.1 42.1 41.4 43.0 0.9 11.7
Dominican Republic 1983 15.6 15.9 17.6 29.8 3.9 9.1
Ecuador 1983 22.0 24.5 28.0 34.0 2.4 9.4
Mexico 1983 20.2 25.8 26.8 52.7 5.8 12.0
Uruguay 1983 12.3 24.4 23.7 19.6 -0.8 9.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984 26.1 29.5 37.6 19.9 7.0 4.3
Congo, Rep. 1985 56.3 75.8 123.5 20.2 12.1 5.7
Lebanon 1986 NA NA NA NA NA 8.0
Sao Tome and Principe 1986 46.5 76.5 117.5 24.2 NA 1.7
Gabon 1986 19.1 35.7 51.0 11.7 3.6 7.9
Nigeria 1986 37.5 42.2 36.9 53.8 -0.1 9.4
Paraguay 1986 12.8 16.3 14.1 13.7 1.3 4.0
Tunisia 1986 17.1 22.0 21.5 22.2 5.4 5.9
Cameroon 1987 15.4 21.0 28.1 15.9 7.4 6.2
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Country Year D/PPP-GDP TDS/X Growth Interest rate
t− 3 t t+ 3 t− 3 . . . t− 1 t− 3 . . . t− 1
Comoros 1987 20.4 34.0 26.9 28.9 2.8 1.2
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 13.8 23.9 24.0 11.0 -4.0 7.6
Vietnam 1988 NA NA 28.2 NA 3.4 0.5
Jordan 1989 44.9 70.3 63.2 32.8 2.7 6.0
Venezuela, RB 1989 38.9 29.7 27.7 43.7 5.3 8.6
El Salvador 1990 14.7 14.2 10.5 34.6 1.8 3.9
Seychelles 1990 43.8 31.8 24.0 9.1 7.0 5.2
Ethiopia 1991 46.7 47.2 37.2 48.6 0.9 1.0
Kenya 1992 25.8 25.6 22.3 37.2 3.4 4.6
Algeria 1994 24.7 26.8 22.4 68.9 -0.5 7.1
Rwanda 1994 10.3 25.0 16.9 16.5 -1.6 1.3
Pakistan 1994 10.3 10.1 9.5 25.4 4.8 3.6
Ghana 1996 23.6 25.7 23.9 24.4 4.1 2.1
Indonesia 1997 16.9 16.5 17.1 30.4 7.9 5.0
Thailand 1997 18.4 26.3 19.7 14.0 8.0 4.3
Brazil 1998 15.1 20.7 18.0 39.7 3.4 6.2
Colombia 1999 13.5 15.2 13.0 36.6 2.0 6.4
Turkey 1999 25.0 28.1 33.6 28.0 5.9 5.7
Kenya 2000 17.7 16.0 16.7 22.1 2.0 3.0
Ecuador 2000 29.3 24.6 26.7 31.2 -0.0 6.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 12.3 10.7 NA 20.9 4.8 3.3
Solomon Islands 2002 15.5 20.5 NA 5.0 -7.9 1.9
Uruguay 2002 20.7 34.3 NA 27.6 -2.6 6.8
Dominican Republic 2003 8.5 12.0 11.1 6.0 4.4 4.8
Dominica 2005 70.3 64.9 54.4 10.5 2.8 3.0
Sri Lanka 2005 19.7 18.0 19.0 11.9 5.1 2.0
Ukraine 2008 12.2 23.7 NA 12.9 6.0 4.1
Benin 2009 6.8 11.6 NA 4.8 4.5 2.8
Appendix B. Extra theoretical results and proofs
This section establishes extra results for the theoretical model.
Appendix B.1. Statics
Lemma 1. Lenders will not lend today more than the present value of the wealth expected
tomorrow, i.e. one has:
∀L ∈ L (Q), (1 + r)L ≤ g¯Q
1− g¯
1+r
Proof. This is the intuitive consequence of the fact that debt is repaid out of the country’s
GDP, that consumption must be positive and that Ponzi games are excluded.
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Corollary 1. The country always defaults if its debt is higher than its wealth, i.e. one has:
d∗(Λ) ≤ 1
1− g¯
1+r
Proof. Suppose the economy is in a state (D,Q, λ) such that:
D >
Q
1− g¯
1+r
If the country decides to repay, lemma 1 shows that it can borrow at most L = g¯Q
(1+r)(1− g¯1+r )
.
It is easy to see that country consumption Q − D + L cannot be positive in that case.
So default is the only option.
Lemma 2. The country does not default if it has access to a contract which gives him a
higher current consumption level than in case of default. Formally, given D, Q and λ, if
there exists L ∈ L (Q) such that L − D ≥ −λµQ − (1 − µ)Q, then default is not optimal,
i.e. Jr(D,Q) ≥ Jd(Q, λ).
Proof. Let L ∈ L (Q) such that L−D ≥ −λµQ− (1− µ)Q. By definition, one has:
Jr(D,Q) ≥ u(Q−D + L) + β
∫
D(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
Jd(g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(Λ′)
+ β
∫
R(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
Jr(D˜′(L,Q), g′Q)dF(g′)dG(Λ′)
Then:
Jr(D,Q)− Jd(Q, λ) ≥ u(Q−D + L)− u((1− λ)µQ)
+ β
∫
R(D˜′(L,Q),Q)
(Jr(D˜′(L,Q), g′Q)− Jd(g′Q, λ))dF(g′)dG(λ′)
Since, by definition, Jr is greater than Jd over the repayment set R, one has:
Jr(D,Q)− Jd(Q, λ) ≥ u(Q−D + L)− u((1− λ)µQ)
So Jr(D,Q)− Jd(Q, λ) ≥ 0 by definition of L, and since u is increasing.
This leads to a lower bound on the default threshold:
Proposition 3. The country never defaults if debt is lower than what the investors can
extract in case of default plus the one-period loss of output due to the negative productivity
shock, i.e. one has:
d∗(λ) ≥ V (1, λ) + 1− µ
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Proof. Suppose the economy is in a state (D,Q, λ) such that D ≤ V (Q, λ)+(1−µ)Q. Then
let:
L =
1
1 + r
∫
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′)
It is easy to see that L ∈ L (Q). Indeed, if the country asks for that level today, the investors
can ask for D˜′(L,Q) = g
max Q
1− g¯
1+r
, which verifies the zero-profit condition (because at such a level
of indebtment, the country will default tomorrow with probability one because of corollary
1).
Given that value for L, one has L−D ≥ −λµQ−(1−µ)Q (becauseD ≤ V (Q, λ)+(1−µ)Q,
and using (9)).
By lemma 2, default is therefore not optimal. The country decides to repay in that
situation.
The result follows using the homogeneity properties.
Appendix B.2. Dynamics
This subsection performs the same derivations as section 4.3, but using more rigorous
notations, and in the general case where λ is stochastic.
The envelope theorem in equation (8) leads to:
∂Jr
∂D
(D,Q) = −u′(C˜(D,Q))
where C˜(D,Q) is the optimal consumption level in case of repayment.
Combining this with the first order condition of the maximization in (8), and using the
fact that Jr and Jd are equal at the default threshold, one gets:
u′(C˜(D,Q)) = β
∂D˜′
∂L
(L˜(D,Q), Q)
∫
R(D˜′(L˜(D,Q),Q),Q)
u′(C˜(D˜′(L˜(D,Q), Q), g′Q)), g′Q)dF(g′)dG(λ′)
(B.1)
where L˜(D,Q) = C˜(D,Q) + D −Q is the optimal level of borrowing in case of repayment.
This is the analog of equation (6) in the two period model.
We now turn to the computation of ∂D˜
′
∂L
, and by the way we will prove proposition 2.
The function D˜′(L,Q) is determined by the implicit equation (10). This equation can be
rewritten as:
f(L,Q, D˜′(L,Q)) = 0
where:
f(L,Q,D′) = D′ P[R(D′, Q)] +
∫
D(D′,Q)
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′)− L(1 + r)
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The implicit function theorem states that there is a unique solution to this implicit equation
if the derivative of f with respect to D′ is non negative, and that in that case we have
∂D˜′
∂L
=
∂f
∂L
∂f
∂D′
.
Using the specific structure of D and R, one can rewrite f as:
f(L,Q,D′) =
∫ 
gmax∫
D′
d∗(λ′)Q
D′dF(g′) +
D′
d∗(λ′)Q∫
0
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)
 dG(λ′)− L(1 + r)
Taking the derivative with respect to D′, one gets:
∂f
∂D′
(L,Q,D′) = P[R(D′, Q)]− D
′
Q
∫
d∗(λ′)− V (1, λ′)
d∗(λ′)2
dG(λ′)
In the general case the sign of this derivative is not constant, since both terms in the
expression are positive (the second term is positive because of proposition 3). But if we
assume that d∗(λ′) = V (1, λ′) (smooth default), we have:
∂f
∂D′
(L,Q,D′) = P[R(D′, Q)] ≥ 0
So the derivative is non null, except in the case where P[R(D′, Q)] = 0 (but in this latter
case, the zero profit condition implies that L = 1
1+r
∫
V (g′Q, λ′)dF(g′)dG(λ′)). Hence in the
smooth default case, the derivative is non null everywhere except on a set of points of empty
interior. Using the implicit function theorem, this implies that there is a unique continuous
function verifying the zero-profit condition. This proves proposition 2.
Moreover, the derivative of the investors’ decision rule D˜′ is:
∂D˜′(L,Q)
∂L
=
∂f
∂L
∂f
∂D′
=
1 + r
P[R(D˜′(L,Q), Q)]− ξ(D˜′(L,Q), Q)
where:
ξ(D′, Q) =
D′
Q
∫
d∗(λ′)− V (1, λ′)
d∗(λ′)2
dG(λ′)
Recall that ξ(D′, Q) ≥ 0 because of proposition 3, and that ξ(D′, Q) = 0 in the smooth
default case. The Euler equation (B.1) can then be rewritten as:
u′(C˜(D,Q)) =
β(1 + r)
P[R(D˜′(L,Q), Q)]− ξ(D˜′(L,Q), Q)
×
∫
R(D˜′(L˜(D,Q),Q),Q)
u′(C˜(D˜′(L˜(D,Q), Q), g′Q))dF(g′)dG(λ′)
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Along an equilibrium path, this means that we have (switching to the notation using
time subscripts):
u′(Ct) = β(1 + r)
(
1− pit+1|t
1− pit+1|t − ξt+1|t
)
Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ]
where ξt+1|t = ξ(Dt+1, Qt), pit+1|t is the probability of default in t+ 1 from the perspective of
date t, and the term Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ] stands for the expectation of u′(Ct+1), from
the perspective of date t, conditionally on the decision to repay at date t+ 1.
This equation reveals the core of the Panglossian theory. First consider the smooth
default case where ξt+1|t = 0. In that case, the equation boils down to:
u′(Ct) = β(1 + r)Et [u′(Ct+1) |R(Dt+1, Qt) ]
When it decides its level of indebtment, the country only takes into account the con-
sequences of its decision for the subset of events where growth is high and makes default
non-optimal. It then rationally ignores risk: this is the Panglossian effect.
Appendix C. Parameter restrictions
Let’s begin by some easy to establish relationships for the growth and debt levels in the
default and repayment cases, derived from equations (19)–(21):
g0it = X
g
i,t−1η
g + εgit
g1it = X
g
i,t−1η
g +Xg,δi,t−1η
g,δ + εgit = g
0
it +X
g,δ
i,t−1η
g,δ (C.1)
d0it = X
d
i,t−1η
d + g0itX
d,g
i,t−1η
d,g + εdit
d1it = X
d
i,t−1η
d + g1itX
d,g
i,t−1η
d,g + εdit = d
0
it +X
g,δ
i,t−1η
g,δXd,gi,t−1η
d,g (C.2)
In the light of these relationships, we choose to impose the following parameter restrictions
stemming from economic theory:
∀i, t : Xd,gi,t−1ηd,g < 0 (C.3)
∀i, t : Xg,δi,t−1ηg,δ < 0 (C.4)
∀i, t : Xδ,di,t−1ηδ,d > 0 (C.5)
Constraint (C.4), combined with (C.1), implies that g1it < g
0
it: growth is always lower in
a crisis scenario than in a no-crisis scenario, ceteris paribus.
Constraint (C.3) means that the debt-to-GDP ratio is a decreasing function of growth.
Combined with (C.4) and (C.2), it implies that d0it < d
1
it: the debt-to-GDP ratio is always
worse in a crisis scenario than in a no-crisis scenario, ceteris paribus.
Constraint (C.5) simply states that the probability of a debt crisis—as given by equation
(21)—is an increasing function of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Appendix D. Likelihood derivation
In this section we derive the likelihood function of the econometric model described in
section 6. The likelihood of a single observation (dit, git, δit) is LΘ(dit, git, δit|Xi,t−1) given the
exogenous values Xi,t−1 and the vector of parameters Θ = (ηd, ηd,g, ηg, ηg,δ, ηδ, ηδ,d, σd, σg, p).
For the remaining of this subsection, the i and t subscripts are dropped for the sake of
simplicity.
Let’s note ϕ the probability density function of the standard normal distribution (zero
mean and unit variance) and Φ its cumulative density function.
Given (d, g, δ), εd and εg can be immediately inferred. The likelihood function is therefore,
by independence of the four shocks (εd, εg, εδ, ζ):
LΘ(d, g, δ|X) = PΘ(εd = d−Xdηd − gXd,gηd,g) PΘ(εg = g −Xgηg − δXg,δηg,δ) PΘ(δ|d,X)
The first two factors are:
PΘ(εd = d−Xdηd − gXd,gηd,g) = 1
σd
ϕ
(
d−Xdηd − gXd,gηd,g
σd
)
PΘ(εg = g −Xgηg − δXg,δηg,δ) = 1
σg
ϕ
(
g −Xgηg − δXg,δηg,δ
σg
)
The third factor is discussed below.
Appendix D.1. Crisis case
If δ = 1, one knows that d = d1 and g = g1. Then:
P(δ = 1|d1, X) = P(Xδηδ + d0Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ > 0) +
pP(Xδηδ + d1Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ > 0 > Xδηδ + d0Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ)
In this equation, the first term corresponds to a crisis driven solely by fundamentals and
exogenous shocks, and the second term to the self-fulfilling case.
Using (C.2), it can be rewritten as:
P(δ = 1|d1, X) = Φ[Xδηδ + (d1 −Xg,δηg,δXd,gηd,g)Xδ,dηδ,d] +
p
{
Φ(Xδηδ + d1Xδ,dηδ,d)− Φ[Xδηδ + (d1 −Xg,δηg,δXd,gηd,g)Xδ,dηδ,d]}
For a given crisis observation, it is therefore possible to compute the a posteriori proba-
bility that the crisis is of a self-fulfilling nature (by opposition to a crisis solely driven by fun-
damentals and exogenous shocks). This probability is computed as the measure of the set of
events where the (unobservable) trigger of default εδit is such thatX
δ
i,t−1η
δ+d1itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d+εδit >
0 > Xδi,t−1η
δ + d0itX
δ,d
i,t−1η
δ,d + εδit. Since only crisis episodes are considered, the value of d
1
it
is directly observable, and that of d0it can be easily found using equation (C.2). It is then
straightforward to compute the probability using the assumption that εδit is be normally
distributed:
SΘ(d1, X) =
p
{
Φ(Xδηδ + d1Xδ,dηδ,d)− Φ[Xδηδ + (d1 −Xg,δηg,δXd,gηd,g)Xδ,dηδ,d]}
PΘ(δ = 1|d1, X)
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Appendix D.2. No-crisis case
If δ = 0, one knows that d = d0. Then:
P(δ = 0|d0, X) = P(Xδηδ + d1Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ < 0) +
(1− p)P(Xδηδ + d1Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ > 0 > Xδηδ + d0Xδ,dηδ,d + εδ)
In this equation, the first term corresponds to the no-crisis equilibrium driven by strong
fundamentals, and the second term to the self-fulfilling case in which the country escapes
the crisis.
Using (C.2), it can be rewritten as:
P(δ = 0|d0, X) = 1− Φ[Xδηδ + (d0 +Xg,δηg,δXd,gηd,g)Xδ,dηδ,d] +
(1− p){Φ[Xδηδ + (d0 +Xg,δηg,δXd,gηd,g)Xδ,dηδ,d]− Φ(Xδηδ + d0Xδ,dηδ,d)}
Appendix E. Estimation methodology
The model is estimated with full information maximum (log-)likelihood, i.e. by comput-
ing the following:
argmax
Θ∈B
∑
(i,t)
logLΘ(dit, git, δit|Xi,t−1)
where B is a set of constraints over parameters to ensure that constraints (C.3), (C.4) and
(C.5) are satisfied and that σd > 0, σg > 0. The parameter p is calibrated.
The programs performing the estimations are written using the R environment for sta-
tistical computing.15
Appendix E.1. Dealing with constraints
The constrained-optimization algorithm that we use is the L-BFGS-B method (Byrd
et al., 1994), which allows box constraints (i.e. each variable can be given a lower and/or
upper bound). The constraints over σd and σg already fit into this category.
Constraints (C.3), (C.4), (C.5) (respectively over ηd,g, ηg,δ, ηδ,d) are enforced by replacing
them with tighter constraints, in the following way:
• First, we only choose constant sign regressors in Xd,g, Xg,δ, Xδ,d (that is, all elements
of a given column in these matrices have a constant sign).
• Second, every component of ηd,g, ηg,δ, ηδ,d is constrained to have the sign that will
enforce the constraint.
Therefore, constraints (C.3), (C.4), (C.5) are clearly satisfied, and the constraints over
ηd,g, ηg,δ, ηδ,d can be dealt with by the L-BFGS-B algorithm.
15See http://www.r-project.org and R Development Core Team (2011).
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Appendix E.2. Non-concavity
The second issue is the fact that the log-likelihood function is not globally concave, which
implies that different initial values in the optimization algorithm can lead to different local
maxima.
This problem is dealt with using a simple randomization algorithm. The following pro-
cedure is repeated 50,000 times:
• Generate a random initial value for the maximization algorithm. We alternate between
two algorithms for generating this point (each algorithm is used half of the time):
– Draw a totally random point. For unconstrained parameters (ηd, ηg, ηδ), a stan-
dard normal distribution is used. For sign-constrained parameters (ηd,g, ηg,δ, ηδ,d, σd, σg),
a χ21 distribution is used (multiplied by −1 for the relevant components of ηd,g,
ηg,δ, ηδ,d).
– Draw a point in the neighborhood of the point which has the highest likelihood
so far. For all parameters, a normal distribution centered around that point is
used, using the same standard error than the maximum likelihood estimator.
• Run the L-BFGS-B algorithm using the initial value thus generated.
• If the result has a greater log-likelihood than the previous best point, keep it, otherwise
discard it.
The results obtained in this way exhibit good numerical stability.
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